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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PAUL J. HENICH, dba P. G. & H. GEN-
ERAL CONTRACTORS, ELLEN JANE 
HENICH, his wife, Defendants, 
MAX S. ANDREWS and NED E. SHURT-
LEFF, individually and as a co-partner· 
ship dba SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and 
SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 
9596 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
By way of reply to Respondent's Brief, appellants respect-
fully submit the following: 
RESPONDENT'S POINT I 
At Page 10 of Respondent's Brief, it is argued that the 
date of the Indemnity Agreement is not important, and is not 
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one of the terms of the agreement. Again, at Page 20, Re-
spondent urges the unimportance of the date of execution. 
At Page 35, respondent again argues that the date which the 
Indemnity Agreement and the Corporate Resolution bear is 
not material. At Page 44 of the brief, respondent quotes the 
Court in part to the same effect. The full quotation of the 
Court is as follows: 
(( ... and I don't just see any escape from it myself 
and, as I say, this matter of date is not important. They 
are not in or they are not out by virtue of the change 
of the date, except the opposite way for them to con-
tradict or modify the written contact that is here." 
For respondents to maintain that the date is unimportant 
and is not one of the terms of the agreement is to totally ignore 
the basis of liability sought to be imposed on appellants by the 
Indemnity Agreement. If the agreement was dated and executed 
December 23, 1959, then appellants could only be liable for 
the Convent Job, not for the P .I.E. Job. On December 23, 1959, 
only the Convent Job coudl have possibly been included under 
the Indemnity Agreement. What term of the contract could 
be more significant to the liabilities imposed thereunder than 
is the date of execution? With one date, to-wit, December 23, 
1959, the P.I.E. Job could not have been included; but with 
the other date, to-wit, January 25, 1960, the P.I.E. Job could 
be included. 
If the date was insignificant, then why did the plaintiff 
have the date notarized on the Indemnity Agreement; why did 
the plaintiff have the Corporate Resolution dated and certified 
to December 23, 1959; and, why did the plaintiff in its Com-
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plaint, allege that the Indemnity Agreement was executed 
December 23, 1959, and the Convent bond issued in reliance 
thereon? The answer is simply that the date establishes liability, 
a liability which could not possibly have included the P .I.E 
Job on December 23, 1959. 
Is the Court warranted in striking from the agreement one 
of two inconsistent provisions? The Indemnity Agreement 
sued on has two completely opposite provisions, i.e., the dates 
and the notarization of December 23, 1959, as opposed to 
the staten1ent on the face of Exhibit 2, to-wit: 
(( ... and the construction of the P.I.E. Truck Ter-
minal, only.'' 
Exhibit 3, the Corporate Resolution, likewise has two con-
tradicting provisions, i.e., on the face thereof appears: 
((Construction of P.I.E. Truck Terminal $271,030.00"; 
but the Certificate of the Corporate Resolution, as \veil as the 
date of the tneeting, show the date, December 23, 1959. 
The Trial Court, in the case of each exhibit, in effect struck 
the notarized and certified statements, the highest and most 
reliable form of authentication of signatures, and left on the 
agreement the unnotarized and uncertified to statements relat· 
ing to the P .I.E. Job. The Court then by parol evidence inserted 
the ambiguous dates of January 25 to January 30, and also by 
parol related these dates back to December 23, 1959. 
This principle violates reasonable principles of interpreta-
tion of the contract document and is indicative of the Court's 
erroneous disregard of the materiality of the date of both 
exhibits. 
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RESPONDENT'S POINT II. 
Under this point, respondent places considerable emphasis 
upon the execution of the financial statements of appellants, 
arguing that these financial statements were admittedly pre-
pared prior to the execution of Exhibit 2, and thus prove that 
Exhibit 2 was executed between January 25, 1960, and January 
30 ,1960. In support of this theory, at Page 23 of Respondent's 
Brief, the testimony of Mr. Henich is quoted in part. Respond-
ent, however, did not complete the quotation, which I quote 
below: 
0 Q. Did you make any contact ·with Wood, Mann & 
Smith concerning these documents ? 
((A. No, I never did. 
((Q. Did you ever go over there and pick them up and 
bring them to Mr. Barton's office? 
((A. I don't even know where their office is, sir. 
0 Q. Well, you don't answer the question. Did you? 
((A. No, I didn't. 
((Q. Did you discuss what period of time that the re-
ports would cover ? 
0 A. Pardon? 
0 Q. Was it discussed with either Mr. Shurtleff or Mr. 
Andrews what period of time would be required 
on these financial statements? 
0 A. Not that I know of, sir." 
Respondent further emphasizes the testimony of Mrs. 
Pugsley, respondent's own witness. However, the substance of 
her testimony was merely that Exhibit 14 was prepared October 
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12, 1959, and Exhibit 15 was prepared January 28, 1960 (R. 
)12). Mrs. Pugsley could not tell who picked up Exhibit 15, 
but she doubted that Henich would have received it, since he 
was a stranger to the office. She further testified that the 
October 12, 1959, statement was delivered apparently to the 
client, but with no definite information as to the actual re-
cipient of the statement (R. 313) . 
Further, respondent, at Page 22 of its brief, claims Mr. 
Andrews admitted the execution of the financial statements 
before the signing of the Indemnity Agreement. This testimony 
of Mr. Andrews, as well as that of Mr. Henich, has been taken 
out of context by respondent to prove its point. There is no 
question but what Mr. Andrews, as well as Mr. Henich, be-
lieved and so testified that the Indemnity Agreement was ex-
ecuted December 23, 1959. Therefore, both of these witnesses, 
in testifying that the financial statement or statements were 
furnished prior to the signing of the Indemnity Agreement, 
actually referred to a period prior to December 23, 1959. As 
is apparent from Pages 21, 22 and 23 of Respondent's Brief, 
the questions propounded to the witnesses were carefully put 
so that the date of the signing was not referred to, but merely 
a period of time prior to the signing. Thus, the answers of 
the witnesses must be considered in context with their prior 
testimony that the signing occurred December 23, 1959. 
The furnishing of the October 12, 1959, financial statement 
1s completely consistent with the signing of the Indemnity 
Agreement some two months later on December 23, 1959. 
Both Andrews and Henich recognized that prior to the Convent 
bond and the signature on December 23, 1959, the financial 
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statement was furnished, or made available. However, there 
is no testimony or evidence from any of the witnesses to show 
that Exhibit 15, the financial statement prepared on January 28, 
1960, was ever delivered to Mr. Barton's office, excepting Mr. 
Barton's · own testimony and that of his employees. This 
testimony of Barton is inconsistent in its application to the 
sequence of events, as has been pointed out in appellants' 
brief. How Mr. Barton obtained Exhibit 15 is not proven by 
respondent. There appears little doubt, however, but that he 
obtained it sometime in late January or early Feoruary, and 
this occurred probably about the time that he issued the bond 
on the P .I.E. Job. His obtaining the financial statement is 
consistent with his issuance of the bond, but it does not show 
that the Indemnity Agreement was executed between January 
25 and January 30. 
RESPONDENT'S POINT III. 
Respondent, in its brief at page 34, indulges in speculative 
reasoning by surmising that even though the Indemnity Agree-
ment had not been filled out at all, appellants would have 
been bound thereunder. The plaintiff's theory of the case and 
its evidence introduced in support thereof, leave no room 
whatsoever for any cause of action based upon a blank Indem-
nity Agreement. Such speculation is merely that, and should 
have no place in respondent's brief. 
Respondent further speculates at Page 38 of its brief, 
that Mr. Shurtleff had fabricated Exhibit 19, which was the 
group of receipts kept in the company files relating to his trip 
to Nevada. This contention is completely unfounded. Re-
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spondent made no objection to their admission (R. 2 58). An 
examination of these various receipts show, of course, that the 
person actually acknowledging receipt of the various items 
was not Mr. Shurtleff, nor was it shown by his signature. 
Instead, individuals signed each separate receipt. 
Respondent at page 19 of its brief, center paragraph, again 
attempts to disparage appellants by stating that certain state-
ments in appellants' brief were untrue. Again respondents have 
but to read the rest of the testimony to see that the statements 
refer to knowledge of the Indemnity Agreement. 
SUMMARY 
Upon neither the testimony cited by respondents nor upon 
the authorities quoted in its brief can the respondent justify 
the complete disregard of the statements under oath by its 
Notary Public, its judicial admission by way of the allegations 
in the Complaint, and the principle that it is not permitted to 
sue upon a notarized agreement and then impeach the agree-
ment to show additional liability of these individual appellants. 
Neither should Respondents be permitted to vary an agreement, 
which admittedly n1ust be in writing, by orally changing the 
dates and orally making the dates retroactive. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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